Financial support for Italy will be costless by Whittaker, John
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Financial support for Italy will be
costless
Whittaker, John
Lancaster University
10 June 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/101025/
MPRA Paper No. 101025, posted 17 Jun 2020 12:57 UTC
  
 
 
 
 
 
MONETARY RESEARCH 
 
 
John Whittaker 
10 June 2020 
 
 
Financial support for Italy will be costless 
Loans to Italy from other eurozone countries will not increase their 
risk exposure, irrespective of the method of financing. 
This is because loans will displace an equal amount of Italy’s Target2 
debt, leaving unchanged the total claim of the eurozone creditors. 
Italy currently has Target2 debt of €513bn to other eurozone 
countries through its central bank. 
If Italy receives grants, this will amount to forgiveness of some of its 
Target2 debt, which will be no loss to the creditors because its 
Target2 debt is unlikely ever to be repaid at full value. 
 
 
© John Whittaker 
+44 (0) 7752 643946 
john.whittaker@lancaster.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Lancaster University Management School 
Lancaster LA1 4YX 
www.lums.lancs.ac.uk
 
1 
 
Financial support for Italy 
Countries such as Italy are likely to receive some 
financial support from other European Union 
governments to assist with recovery from the 
coronavirus pandemic. Under the latest 
‘recovery plan’1 proposed by the European 
Commission and endorsed by France and 
Germany, the Commission will raise funds by 
issuing long-dated debt on behalf of the EU, to 
be repaid from the EU budget from 2027 
onwards.  
The centrepiece of the plan is the Recovery and 
Resilience Facility with a proposed budget of 
€560bn, of which €250bn will be loans and 
€310bn grants. Of the grants, Italy is allocated 
the largest slice of €63bn. However, the value of 
any grants that finally reach Italy and other 
beneficiaries may be smaller, as all EU 
governments need to agree. 
Whatever financing structure is arranged, the 
overriding constraint is the reticence of some of 
the potential lenders or donors, i.e. the other 
eurozone or EU countries. There is concern 
about the risk exposure of loans and a general 
aversion to handouts. 
They need not be concerned. Eurozone countries 
are already exposed to Target2 debts of other 
eurozone members through the eurosystem of 
central banks. For instance, Italy currently owes 
€513bn (April 2020, Chart 1). As will be 
explained, loans or grants to Italy cause Italy’s 
Target2 debt to fall by an equal amount; 
therefore loans leave the exposure of other 
eurozone countries to Italy unchanged, where 
exposure is properly measured as the sum of 
loans and the ECB’s Target2 claim on Italy.  
If the assistance is grants, this has no cost to the 
donors as it merely amounts to reducing Italy’s 
Target2 debt closer to its market value. 
 
1 European Commission (2020a, 2020b). For helpful 
analyses of other possible funding devices, including 
the much-discussed eurobond and the Corona bond, 
see Perotti (2020) and Bini-Smaghi (2020). 
Target2 balances 
Target2 balances are debts between the national 
central banks (NCB) of the eurosystem and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and they are an 
essential feature of monetary union. Unlimited 
credit between the NCBs is necessary to ensure 
that euros exchange at par in all eurozone 
countries. Target2 balances are the result of 
accumulated net cross-border financial flows, 
which may be payments for trade or they may be 
investment flows unrelated to trade.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider, for instance, a movement of a bank 
deposit from an Italian bank to a German bank. 
The Italian bank makes up for its lost deposit by 
drawing from its current account at its central 
bank (the Bank of Italy: BoI); the current account 
of the German bank at the Bundesbank (German 
central bank) is credited; and the Bundesbank 
acquires a claim on the BoI. Under eurosystem 
accounting practices, such changes in NCB 
Target2 balances are netted across all NCBs and 
recorded as claims on or liabilities to the ECB. 
The broad features of Target2 balances (Chart 2) 
are that ‘core’ countries such as Germany have 
 
2
 The nature of the Target2 balances has been widely 
discussed elsewhere. See, for instance, Whittaker 
(2016) and the comprehensive analysis in Sinn (2014). 
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claims, whilst the greatest liabilities are those of 
the ‘peripheral’ countries, notably Italy and 
Spain, largely caused by capital flows from the 
periphery to the core since 2008. Movements in 
Italy’s Target2 liability (Chart 1) are related to 
the spread in yields between Italian and German 
10-year government bonds and reflect changes 
in investors’ views of Italy’s debt sustainability.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If Italy receives funds from the EU recovery plan, 
whether as loans or grants, this is an inflow into 
Italy and it will cause an equal reduction in Italy’s 
Target2 liability, in the same manner as the 
private cross-border flows described above.4  
 
3 Eisenschmidt et al. (2017) argue that much of the 
increase in Italy’s Target2 liability during 2016-17 was 
associated with the asset purchase programme. They 
point out that some of the Italian government debt 
purchased by the BoI came from non-euro countries 
(e.g. the UK) with the payment routed through the 
Bundesbank. These transactions are therefore 
recorded as capital outflows from Italy to Germany. 
But this explanation of the rise in Italian Target2 debt 
does not lessen the eurosystem exposure to it. 
4As an example of the relevant transactions, suppose 
the Italian government receives a tranche of a loan 
from the recovery fund, which the fund draws from 
its ECB account and the Italian government deposits 
at the BoI. Clearance of the position between the ECB  
 
 
Target2 Risks 
Target2 balances are a peculiar form of debt in 
that they are never settled. No NCB with a 
Target2 liability is ever obliged to pay to Target2 
claimants, nor is there any mechanism for this.5 
And although Target2 debts bear interest (at the 
ECB’s main refinancing rate, currently zero) the 
interest is merely rolled into the debt. Thus, 
Italy’s Target2 liability is solely driven by net 
cross-border payments through the eurosystem. 
At present, there is little prospect of Italy 
achieving trade surpluses or attracting capital 
inflows sufficient to cause a significant reduction. 
The only event that would bring a demand for 
Italy to settle its Target2 liability would be its 
departure from the monetary union (exit from 
the euro) and the reestablishment of its own 
currency.6 However, the BoI would be unable to 
pay because it does not have enough suitable 
assets. It has gold and net foreign (i.e. non-euro) 
assets of €184bn (April 2019, see balance sheet, 
Table 1) which are potentially available for this 
purpose. Otherwise, the BoI’s main assets are its 
holding of Italian government debt (€522bn, 
mostly acquired as part of the ECB’s asset 
purchase programmes) and its refinancing loans 
to banks (€279bn, collateralised mostly by Italian 
government debt).  
The best that the ECB and other NCBs could 
hope for, in settlement of most of their €513bn 
 
and the BoI occurs by means of a fall in the ECB’s 
Target2 claim and a fall in the BoI’s Target2 liability, 
each by the amount of the tranche.  
5 This contrasts with the US where there is annual 
settlement of the inter-district balances of the Feds 
(Federal Reserve Banks), using Federal government 
debt or agency debt. The US system also differs from 
the eurosystem in that the Feds are not associated 
with states: each Fed deals with banks in several 
states and Fed profits go to the US government.  
6 Former ECB President Mario Draghi has said that  
“If a country were to leave the Eurosystem, its 
national central bank’s claims on or liabilities to the 
ECB would need to be settled in full” (Draghi, 2017). 
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Target2 claim on the BoI7, would be a claim on 
the Italian government. Unhelpfully, this would 
replace one type of claim against the Italian state 
with another. And with its new currency likely to 
depreciate relative to the euro, Italy’s capacity to 
pay euro-denominated debt would be further 
eroded. 
 
Table 1. Bank of Italy balance sheet  
April 2020  
assets € billions 
gold and net foreign assets 184 
loans to banks (refinancing) 279 
Italian government debt 522 
intra-eurosystem claims: 
claim on the ECB 1 
banknote adjustment 
59 
8 
51 
other 78 
total 1,122 
liabilities  
banknote allocation 209 
bank reserves 115 
government deposits 70 
intra-eurosystem liability: 
Target2 
 
513 
other 53 
capital 2 162 
total 1,122 
net eurosystem debt = 513 – 59 = 454 
actual banknote issue = 209 – 51 = 158 
1 The Bank of Italy’s share of ECB capital and 
its claim for foreign (non-euro) assets 
transferred to the ECB. 
2 includes revaluation accounts (€136bn). 
Source: Bank of Italy 
 
 
7 There is another important contribution to intra-
eurosystem debts which arises from differences in the 
values of banknotes issued by each NCB (see 
Whittaker, 2016). In the case of Italy, the banknote 
issue of the BoI is less than its allocation, leading to a 
credit of €51bn (April 2020). Taking this and some 
other small adjustments into account, Italy’s total 
(but still unpayable) eurosystem debt is €454bn (see 
balance sheet, Table 1). 
Financial support for Italy will be costless 
This leads to two relevant conclusions. First, a 
departure of Italy from monetary union would 
force the ECB to recognise a loss of part of the 
BoI’s Target2 liability. The other NCBs would 
bear this loss, apportioned according to their 
capital keys (i.e. shares) in the ECB, with the 
Bundesbank suffering the most (31.8%: higher 
than its current 26.4% capital key because of 
Italy’s departure).8 And because all NCB profits 
and losses accrue to their respective 
governments,9 it is the German government that 
bears the exposure to this risk of loss on the 
Bundesbank’s Target2 claim. 
In assessing the risk exposure of Germany and 
other eurozone countries, Italy’s Target2 liability 
must therefore be counted together with any 
official lending to Italy. It follows that lending to 
Italy will not increase the exposure of the 
eurozone creditors because it will displace an 
equal value of Italy’s Target2 debt.10  
 
8 There is no provision on NCB balance sheets for this 
risk, the official justification being that no country is 
likely to leave the euro. According to the Bundesbank 
(Annual Report 2019, liabilities note 12 provisions): 
The Bundesbank could hypothetically be affected - - - 
by the risk to which the Eurosystem is exposed if a 
euro-area country were to leave the single currency 
area and its central bank failed to settle its TARGET2 
liability to the ECB - - -. It considers this scenario to 
be unlikely to materialise . 
9 Most central banks are owned by their 
governments, an exception being the BoI whose 
private owners receive a maximum of 6% of profits as 
dividends (Bholat, 2019). The Italian government 
receives BoI profits after private dividends (and any 
provisions) have been covered and bears its losses. 
The processes for NCBs’ remittances to their 
governments are described in Bunea et al. (2016). The 
profits and losses of the ECB accrue to its 
shareholders: the NCBs. 
10 The set of countries that will be relieved of Target2 
exposure to Italy if Italy receives a loan or grant (the 
18 eurozone countries, excluding Italy), may not be 
the same or in the same proportion as the set 
providing the loan or grant. The ‘recovery fund’ will 
be repaid by all EU members. 
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Second, neither principal nor interest on Italy’s 
Target2 debt will be paid whilst Italy remains in 
the euro and in the only scenario in which 
payment would be demanded, i.e. exit from the 
euro, full payment would not be possible. Hence, 
however remote the possibility of Italy’s exit, the 
fair value of the BoI’s Target2 debt (i.e. its 
current market value if it were a tradable asset) 
is less than its book value. 
If Italy receives assistance in the form of grants, 
this will also displace an equal value of Italy’s 
Target2 debt. Even if Italy is given as much as the 
€63bn proposed by the Commission, this 
reduction in Italy’s Target2 debt is unlikely to 
take it below its fair value. The grants amount to 
forgiveness of debt that will never be settled. 
They will be effectively costless. 
Why not just cancel some Target2 debt? 
There is a simpler way to give money to the 
Italian government. The ECB could just cancel 
some of Italy’s Target2 debt directly, which 
would amount to a transfer from the ECB to the 
BoI. The BoI balance sheet would record an 
increase in profit that would pass to the Italian 
government; and the other eurozone 
governments would need to pay through their 
NCBs to replenish the ECB’s capital.  
This would hand cash to Italy while avoiding the 
agony of finding an agreed funding structure. It 
would also need some inventive interpretation 
of the Treaties or the ECB Statute. 
Yet, the more important issue both for Italy and 
its eurozone partners is not how to go about 
giving or lending to Italy, but rather to ensure 
sustainability of its government debt. While 
direct financial support for the Italian 
government will help, the main instrument for 
this purpose remains BoI purchases. The ECB will 
have to find ways to placate the German 
Constitutional Court, allowing this to continue 
indefinitely. 
 
References 
Bholat, David and Karla Gutierrez (2019), 'The ownership of central banks', Bank Underground, Bank of 
England, 18 October.  
Bini-Smaghi, Lorenzo (2020). 'Corona bonds – great idea but complicated in reality', VoxEU, 28 March. 
Bunea, Daniela, Polychronis Karakitsos, Niall Merriman and Werner Studener (2016), 'Profit distribution 
and loss coverage rules for central banks', European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series 169, April. 
Bundesbank (2019), Annual Report. 
Draghi (2017), letter to Marco Valli MEP and Marco Zanni MEP, European Central Bank, 18 January. 
Eisenschmidt, Jens, Danielle Kedan, Martin Schmitz, Ramon Adalid and Patrick Papsdorf (2017), ‘The 
Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme and TARGET balances', European Central Bank Occasional Paper 
Series, No.196, September. 
European Commission (2020a), 'The EU budget powering the recovery plan for Europe', COM(2020) 442 
final, 27 May. 
European Commission (2020b), 'Europe's moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation', 
COM(2020) 456 final, 27 May. 
Perroti, Roberto (2020), ‘The European response to the Covid-19 crisis: A pragmatic proposal to break the 
impasse’, VoxEU, 21 April. 
Sinn, Hans-Werner (2014), ‘The Euro Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets, and Beliefs’, Oxford University 
Press. 
Whittaker, John (2016), 'Eurosystem debts do matter', Monetary Research, Lancaster University 
Management School, 1 February. 
  
